Manzano Guzmān Isidoro ,
Intelligencia sentiente segųn Escoto ,
Antonianum, 71/3 (1996) p. 523-564
SUMMARY: The author, having already written on this theme three articles, which could commonly be entitled «concrete cognitive modes» according to Scotus, is motivated to resume the same theme by certain affirmations, according to him incorrect and rather erroneous, of a particular study, which appears in the «Acta» of the last International Scotistic Congress. Recognising a certain ambiguity in the texts of Scotus, the author endeavours to formulate a coherent interpretation, starting from the principle of partial causality, which is the basic principle of Scotus' teaching on the subject.The author distinguishes systematically three types of knowledge: abstract knowledge, abstractive knowledge and intuition, determining their proper characteristics.The author delineates Scotus' thought on abstract knowledge in the text of «The origin of the in-telligibles» (De origine intelligibilium), which is the normal type of concrete or abstractive knowledge. He then proceeds towards distinct knowledge, which is obtained through formalisa-tion and abstraction. In the end he takes into consideration intuition as a cognitive mode pro nunc», with its proper characteristics.Concrete intellection or abstractive knowledge of the concrete object constitutes the actus scienti-ficus, the fundamental element of every scientific knowledge, whereas intuition, the simultaneous act of actual concrete intellection, establishes the existential fact or radical contingency of beings, founded on free activity.